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標題: [時事討論] “否決政治”讓美國癱瘓 Francis Fukuyama [打印本頁]

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-11-24 08:57 AM 標題: “否決政治”讓美國癱瘓 Francis Fukuyama

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-11-24 08:58 AM 編輯   t1 g7 R  T3 C3 t

“否決政治”讓美國癱瘓  Francis FukuyamaTVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。6 n8 e$ g5 E, o: J! W, u

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美國國會超級委員會未能就預算達成協議，悲哀地反映出當今美國國內的對立局面。但造成失敗的並不是那些負責減赤計劃的個人，而是美國政治制度的特性。盡管超級委員會不光彩地失敗了，但它卻指出了一個也許能讓我們擺脫僵局的思路。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb& @# a- ]9 P$ D1 v3 r$ H' q, w

美國人對自己的憲法很自豪，這部憲法通過一系列制衡限制了行政權力。但這些制衡已經發生了變異。現在的美國奉行的是“否決政治”(vetocracy)。當這種體制遇上被意識形態化了的兩個政黨——其中一個政黨甚至把堵住稅收漏洞視作增稅，因而不可接受——時，就會導致政治癱瘓。公仔箱論壇! ^& Q1 Z6 |* {6 P. l0 l3 q
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與經典的英國“威斯敏斯特政體”相比，美國政治體制的問題尤其明顯。英國採用的是簡單多數票當選的議會制，沒有聯邦或分權制度，也沒有成文憲法或司法復核。在這種體制下，政府一般會獲得議會絕對多數票的支持。現任聯合政府的形式在英國歷史上極為罕見。一般來說，英國執政黨在議會佔據絕對多數。隻要擁有英國下議院半數席位再加1票，就可以通過或推翻任何法律，這就是為什麼英國有時會被稱作“民主獨裁”(democratic dictatorship)。. U2 O6 Z$ v' \" N% W8 ^) d
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相比之下，美國的政治制度在總統和擁有兩院的國會之間分割權力，並把權力下放給各州和地方政府﹔允許法庭以憲法為由推翻法律。這是一套故意設計出來的體制，用以防止政府一意孤行，它背后是美國政治文化中，對“集權”的一種強烈懷疑。

在英國體制中，能用上“否決票”的機會不多，這個優勢在預算這件事情上十分明顯。英國財政大臣作為一個行政代理人，在對支出和稅收進行艱難權衡之后，提出一個預算草案。議會通常會在一兩周后，幾乎不做修改地通過這個預算。# L( F  l3 b/ }6 H& S) {5 m; l

相比之下，在美國體制下，總統在一個財政周期開始時，就要宣布一個預算草案。這份草案更多地隻是政府“想要”的一個預算，離“政治現實”差距甚遠。根據美國憲法，國會擁有決定政府開支的絕對權力，535名國會議員都可以用手中握著的否決權來換取某種妥協。在經過幾個月利益集團的游說之后，最終出台的預算法案不再是一個條理清晰的政府規劃的產物，而是議員們相互角力的結果。而議員們發現，用增加支出來換取減稅，總是更容易達成共識，所以美國財政永遠更容易出現赤字。

除了憲法授予的制衡機制以外，美國國會還給了議員們其它許多機會，讓他們可以使用否決權來要挾政府，比如100名參議員中的任何一人，都可以對行政部門的某項任命使用“匿名阻止表決權”。眼下就有一個極端的例子。奧巴馬政府希望任命邁克爾•麥克福爾(Michael McFaul)為美國駐俄羅斯大使，但由於某些匿名共和黨參議員的反對，參議院外交關系委員會無限期地推遲了表決。曾是斯坦福大學教授的麥克福爾在過去三年一直擔任國家安全委員會(NSC)負責俄羅斯和歐亞事務的高級理事（也是筆者的一個老朋友）。他被廣泛視為駐俄大使的合適人選，甚至共和黨人也這麼認為。根據《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)的報道，行使“匿名阻止表決權”的其中一位參議員之所以這麼做，是想讓聯邦政府在自己所在的州建設一個設施。結果是，在明年3月俄羅斯選舉新總統時，美國駐俄大使可能還沒有上任。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb! }; }$ S7 s' E0 [7 @* |
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要擺脫目前的政治僵局，我們不僅需要強大的領導層，還需要修改關系到美國政治機構的法律法規。修改美國憲法目前看上去不太可能，但美國可以實施一系列改革，來減少動用“否決票”的機會和簡化決策程序。可以實施的改革，一是廢除參議員的“阻止表決權”，二是減少對常規立法的阻撓，第三是禁止通過不相干的修訂案進行“立法要挾”。公仔箱論壇4 K$ o4 H( p  D

但可能進行的最重要的一項改革，是把預算過程轉變得更類似於“威斯敏斯特體系”。正如這次失敗的超級委員會那樣，預算應由一組精簡得多的議員制定。委員會的成員中，應該有一大部分是來自非黨派機構——比如美國國會預算辦公室(CBO)——的技術專家，而不像現在這樣充斥著黨派斗爭。技術專家們受到的來自利益集團的壓力，要比現任議員們小得多。預算編制完成后，應該送交國會，在不允許修訂的情況下進行一次要麼通過、要麼失敗的直接表決。類似程序已有成功先例，比如為了規避利益集團之間的僵局而走“快速通道”的一些貿易立法﹔非黨派委員會在決定關閉哪座軍事基地時也使用了這種程序。

但在當前黨派對立的氛圍下，美國不可能接受這種建議。共和黨總統提名候選人之一的紐特•金裡奇(Newt Gingrich)最近將國會預算辦公室稱為“社會主義”機構。但美國的財政麻煩如此之大，而美國經濟還在繼續滯漲，使得實施上述改革看上去至關重要。現任議員們肯定不願意很快放棄他們的否決權，正因為如此，我們首先必須通過廣泛的基層動員來推動政治改革。tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb; ?7 R* C% ~- y0 `/ p2 a+ X

Francis Fukuyama 是美國斯坦福大學弗裡曼•斯波利研究所(Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute)高級研究員，其最新著作是《政治秩序諸起源》(The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution)

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-11-24 08:58 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-11-24 09:04 AM 編輯

Oh for a democratic dictatorship and not a vetocracy  Francis Fukuyamatvb now,tvbnow,bttvb) h' @/ f+ ~/ O9 c8 b
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The failure of the congressional supercommittee to reach a deal on the budget is a sad reflection of the polarisation in the US today. But this failure has roots that go well beyond the individuals charged with coming up with a plan to reduce the deficit; they go to the very nature of the political system. And while this committee has failed ignominiously, it contains the seed of an idea that might show us a way out of paralysis.
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American stake great pride in a constitution that limits executive power through a series of checks and balances. But those checks have metastasised. And now America is a vetocracy. When this system is combined with ideologised parties, one of which sees even the closing of tax loopholes as an unacceptable tax increase, the result is paralysis.

The problems of the US system are all too apparent when compared with the classic British Westminster system: parliamentary, with first-past-the-post voting, no federalism or decentralisation, and no written constitution or judicial review. Under such a system, governments are typically backed by a strong legislative majority. The present government’s coalition is highly unusual for the UK, which typically gives the leading party a strong parliamentary majority. A simple majority plus one in the House of Commons can make or overturn any law in the land, which is why it has sometimes been referred to as a democratic dictatorship.8 r- T' R. S* H, b1 t$ k+ v! |9 i# ^# o
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The American system, by contrast, splits power between a president and a two-chamber Congress; devolves power to states and local government; and permits the courts to overturn legislation on constitutional grounds. The system is deliberately engineered to put obstacles in the way of decisive government,which in turn is the result of a political culture strongly suspicious of centralised power.

The advantage of the British system with its fewer opportunities to cast vetoes is clear when it comes to passing budgets. The budget is written by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who as an executive agent makes the difficult trade-offs between spending and taxes. This budget is passed by parliament, with little modification, a week or two after the government introduces it.

In the American system, by contrast, the president announces a budget at the beginning of the fiscal cycle; it is more an aspirational document than apolitical reality. The US constitution firmly locates spending authority in Congress, and indeed all 535 members of Congress use their potential veto power to extract concessions. The budget that eventually emerges after months of interest group lobbying is the product not of a coherent government plan, but of horse-trading among individual legislators,who always find it easier to achieve consensus by exchanging spending increases for tax cuts. Hence the permanent bias towards deficits.

In addition to the checks and balances mandated by the constitution, Congress has added a host of further opportunities for legislators to use their veto power to blackmail the system, such as the anonymous holds that any of 100 senators may place on executive branch appointments. A particularly egregious example of this is taking place today. The Obama administration has wanted to appoint Michael McFaul ambassador to Russia, but the foreign relations committee has put off action indefinitely due to the objections of certain unnamed Republican senators. Mr McFaul – formerly a professor at Stanford (and also a longtime friend) – has been senior director for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council for the past three years and is widely regarded even by the Republicans as well qualified for the job. Foreign Policy magazine has reported that one of the holds is due to a senator wanting the federal government to build a facility in his state. As a result, the US may not have an ambassador in place in Moscow next March as the Russians vote for a new president.TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。: K  R1 w" E( E! y) s
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If we are to get out of our present paralysis we need not only strong leadership,but changes in institutional rules. If constitutional amendments are off the table for the moment, there is nonetheless a list of reforms the US could undertake to reduce the number of veto points and simplify decision-making. One would be to eliminate senatorial holds; another would be a rollback of the filibuster for routine legislation; and a third would be a rule that would prevent legislative blackmail through irrelevant amendments.4 {- C! \3 ^  Y8 p0 }4 M  ^  a" n! f
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But the most important potential change would be to move the budgeting process towards something that looked more like the Westminster system. Budgets would be formulated, as in the case of the failed supercommittee, by a much smaller group of legislators. Unlike today’s strongly partisan committee, it would have heavy technocratic input from a non-partisan agency like the Congressional Budget Office that would be insulated from the interest group pressures that afflict the sitting legislators. A completed budget would be put before Congress in a single, unamendable up-or-down vote. The procedure has already been used successfully to get around interest group deadlock in fast-track trade legislation and by the non-partisan commission that decided which military bases to close.

This proposal has no chance of being accepted in the current climate of polarisation. Newt Gingrich, one of the Republican contenders for the party’s presidential nomination, recently called the CBO a “socialist” institution. But our unaddressed fiscal problem is so great that something like it would seem essential as our economy continues to stagnate. Serving legislators are unlikely to be willing to give up their veto power soon. That is why political reform must first and foremost be driven by popular, grassroots mobilisation.
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Francis Fukuyama is a senior fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute. His latest book is The Origins of Political Order: From PrehumanTimes to the French Revolution

作者: felicity2010 時間: 2011-11-24 09:05 AM

本帖最後由 felicity2010 於 2011-11-24 09:31 AM 編輯
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Defense and Democracy in America  Bennett Ramberg公仔箱論壇) X- k) X. {: q) u; P2 L) H
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The failure of the US Congressional Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction to reach agreement on budget cuts now sets the stage for $1.2 trillion in automatic reductions to begin in January 2013.Should these cuts go into effect, the US Defense Department, which already must implement $450 billion in reductions over ten years, will take half the hit.But pushback has already begun, with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta arguing that further reductions will impose “substantial risk” to America’s national security.os.tvboxnow.com8 f, m9 w$ p. i0 @

But, if history is a guide, global events, not deficit hawks or military promoters, will have the ultimate say over how far defense reductions go. As the Cold War ended, who would have thought that the US would become entangled in Somalia, the Balkans, and Kuwait – or, when the new century began, that the US would spend hundreds of billions of dollars per year on wars in Southwest Asia.

While America must, of course, bear any cost to fight a war of survival, throughout history, America’s economic power gave it a broad cushion to pursue wars of choice. In today’s world, one would think that US economic distress would cure that compulsion. But that did not happen in Libya, and events will likely tempt future presidents to behave in the same way, despite the risks. And Congress is unlikely to use its authority to play a more assertive role if legislators wed themselves to the recent past.

America’s fiscal challenges ought to prompt a re-evaluation.Practical change requires revision of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which grants presidents unfettered rights to commit American forces for 60 days. More fundamentally, Congress must ask itself whether the responsibilities that it assumed in America’s formative years provide a template for today.
“Upon the whole it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce,” Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson advised President George Washington in 1790, as he pondered a response to continued attacks by the Barbary Pirates on America’s merchant fleet off of North Africa. With no navy to speak of, Congress had little choice but to grin and bear it.

In 1798, it stopped doing so. It responded to revolutionary France’s attacks on American ships destined for England by voiding treaties and commercial agreements, and then, at President John Adams's request, by authorizing the use of force.tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb* u7 `5 N- t8 b* q) F, {* [
By the time Jefferson assumed the presidency, that quasi-war had ended, but the challenge posed by the Barbary Pirates remained. In 1801, with Congress absent from the capital, Jefferson took matters into his own hands, ordering a new fleet of frigates to sea to protect merchant shipping. Still mindful of Congress’ critical role in war-making, Jefferson asked for and received ratification when legislators returned.公仔箱論壇) _% P( v7 ?2 W, N+ t- v
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A decade later, in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars, with the British attacking American ships and impressing sailors,Congress broke with the past. Despite divisions, for the first time it used the power granted by the Constitution to declare war. In the nearly 200 years that followed, Congress did so only four more times, three in response to attacks on US maritime interests – the Spanish-American War and the two world wars – and the Mexican-American War in 1846.

President James K. Polk provoked the Mexican-American war by sending American forces across the disputed Texas frontier without congressional consent. That set a precedent that would be replayed in repeated interventions in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico from the turn of the century through the early 1930’s,as well as in interventions in China and Russia. Throughout, Congress remained largely impassive." I* I9 X- l- ^* U' e& F
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That passivity continued after World War II,not only in Latin America, but also in US interventions around the world – Korea, the Balkans, Lebanon, Somalia, and now Libya. In other instances – the Formosa Straits, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait – Congress issued broad authorizations but no declaration of war.

Had the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq gone well, perhaps the US could accept the costs and manner of authorization.But they did not go well, bolstering those who declare “enough,” and prompting the question of whether the US president alone – even under the facade of congressional authorizations rather than formal declarations of war – ought to bear the war-making responsibility.tvb now,tvbnow,bttvb# p8 Y2 E% l* P9 d; F3 b
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At the time that it advanced its draft war-powers legislation, the Senate said “no.” Instead, it proposed that Congress assume the authority to commit forces to combat without a war declaration except to forestall or respond to an armed attack on the US or to protect the evacuation of American citizens from foreign soil. But the final War Powers Resolution rejected that approach.TVBNOW 含有熱門話題，最新最快電視，軟體，遊戲，電影，動漫及日常生活及興趣交流等資訊。$ Z8 _, v& P/ |1 W2 _; }/ T9 |

Those who feel comfortable with the status quo would do well to heed the conclusion Representative Abraham Lincoln reached at the end of the Mexican-American War: “Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion,and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war at pleasure.”公仔箱論壇  Z( F1 q4 Y" L8 o6 U: A" U
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In today’s difficult economic era, only Congress can ensure that the president’s pleasure no longer becomes the country’s burden. The time to act in formulating new legislation is now, before the next war of choice presents itself.

Bennett Ramberg served as a foreign policy analyst and consultant to the US Department of State and the US Senate. He is the author of several books on international security.

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